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Abstract
Contact
Recent developments in contracting practice in the UK have built upon recommendations contained in high-
profile reports, such as those by Latham and Egan.  However, the New Engineering Contract  (NEC), endorsed
by Latham, is based upon principles of contract drafting that seem open to question.  Any contract operates in
the context of its legislative environment and current working practices.  This report identifies eight contentious
hypotheses in the literature on construction contracts and tests their validity in a sample survey that attracted
190 responses.  The survey shows, among other things, that while partnership is a positive and useful idea,
authoritative contract management is considered more effective and that “win-win” contracts, while desirable,
are basically impractical.  
Further, precision and fairness in contracts are not easy to achieve simultaneously. While participants should
know what is in their contracts, they should not routinely resort to legal action; and standard-form contracts
should not seek to be universally applicable.  Fundamental changes to drafting policy should be undertaken
within the context of current legal contract doctrine and with a sensitivity to the way that contracts are used in
contemporary practice.  
Attitudes to construction contracting may seem to be changing on the surface, but detailed analysis of what lies
behind apparent agreement on new ways of working reveals that attitudes are changing much more slowly than
they appear to be.
Please note that a copy of the questionnaire used in this study is available from the RICSFoundation upon
r e q u e s t .
Will Hughes
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Reading    
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In the UK, the Latham Report (1994) raised some interesting
questions about how construction contracts should be drafted
and carried some controversial implications for construction
contract policy (Cox and Townsend 1997). Calls from major
public sector bodies for innovative working practices and a
reduced dependency on competitive tendering and adversarial
contracting have increased since the Latham Report, with a
succession of reports calling for changes to commercial
practices in the construction industry. The Levene Report
(Cabinet Office Efficiency Unit 1995) called for less conflict
and disputes as well as a more sophisticated approach to
procurement by government departments. The Egan Report
(1998) suggested that contracts should be replaced entirely with
performance measurements. Drawing upon these and a wide
range of other recent reports on the industry, the National Audit
Office (Bourn 2001) reinforces the message that the traditional
reliance on lowest-price bidding and tendering separately for
each stage of the project are wasteful exercises resulting in
escalating costs and likelihood of expensive disputes. Clearly,
there is a gathering momentum towards establishing new ways
of working that change the basis upon which commercial
processes are carried out in construction. The considerations
underlying this seem to be welcomed by all as a positive move
in the right direction.
There is no doubt that a drafting policy for construction
contracts can have a significant potential impact on the
profitability and outcome of construction projects, but although
current trends in construction procurement should be applauded
for encouraging a reassessment of contract policy, policy
generally has only been considered with a view to solving
specific problems, rather than to developing a coherent drafting
policy (Uff 1988). The gathering tide of opinion towards these
innovative methods of procurement raises interesting questions
about the views of practitioners in the construction industry
regarding contract policy.
Before considering these issues in more depth, it is interesting
to note that a contrary view on procurement practice comes
from the Far East. Although the Japanese construction industry
has long encouraged mutual trust, also known as psychological
contracts  (Cole 1996), the Japanese government has shaped its
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT POLICY: DO WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY ?
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1 policy to promote more rigid contractual relationships betweenparties in order to improve the efficiency of the construction
processes (Ministry of Construction 1998). So, while early
moves towards new ways of working in the UK appeared to be
based upon Japanese practices (Bennett 1992), this is
happening at a time when the Japanese industry is moving
toward what might be called a “traditional” situation in the UK
construction industry.
There is no doubt that Latham’s report has played a significant
part in the industry in terms of igniting lively discussions about
construction contracts. However, some commentators have
criticised the report for being “anecdotally rather than
empirically based” (Bick 1997) because the work was based
upon a review of submitted evidence, rather than an
academically-structured piece of research. This view has led to
a number of arguments about Latham’s recommendations (see
for example, Uff 1997b), especially about the legislation that
has followed. Such arguments may indicate a difference
between legal, academic and practical perceptions of the
industry. From a research point of view, this raises the question
of how, exactly, participants in the construction industry view
the kind of policy that ought to underpin the drafting of
construction contracts. Although there have been surveys in
this area (for example, Barrick 1995, Gaitskell 1995), they tend
to explore attitudes of people toward the general issues, rather
than analysing in depth the consequences of innovative
procurement practice.
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to:
1. Investigate the contract policy which underpins current 
innovations in procurement practice.
2. Relate recent contract policy developments to contract 
theory, derived from both the construction industry and 
general business transactions.
3. Explore the attitudes of people in the UK construction 
industry with respect to the extent to which they 
subscribe to the beliefs that underpin innovative 
working practices.
This study does not aim to explore the full range of issues
relating to construction procurement, but just those aspects
related to contract policy.
contracts (Sidney 1990). For example, in the Japanese
construction process, when variations occur, the contract states
that the contractor may request negotiation (Omoto 1996).
Although such a contractual clause gives the contractor an
opportunity to negotiate, it can be said to be based upon a spirit
of mutual trust and co-operation and fairness. Contractual
matters, in Japanese practice, are often subject to the client’s
decisions and the contractors are very likely to be in a weaker
position (Kunishima and Shoji 1995). This indicates that a spirit
of mutual trust and co-operation may not always work well in
construction practice. 
Finally, Latham argued that legislation was necessary in order
to get the construction industry to use contracts which
conformed with his proposals (Latham 1994: 84). However, due
to the failure of the industry and client groups to agree over the
coverage of such legislation, the main aim of the legislation was
limited to achieving security of payment.
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The Latham Report, entitled “Constructing the Team”, was a
product of a joint government and industry review of the
construction industry (Jenkins 1995). In the foreword of the
Report, Latham states that the prime aim of his review is to
assist clients in executing high quality projects through better
performance and fairness to all participants in the project, and
he adds that teamwork is needed to achieve this aim (Latham
1994: v).  By 1995, there was widespread awareness of the
report, at least among clients of the construction industry
(Barrick 1995).  Subsequently, approaches to procurement
practice have been developed in a way that fully endorses and
puts into practice the themes introduced by Latham (Cabinet
Office Efficiency Unit 1995, Bourn 2001).
Concerning contract policy issues, Latham proposes some basic
principles of a modern construction contract. Moreover, he
strongly criticises existing standard forms of contract and the
means by which they are produced. Among his principles of
modern contract conditions are; promoting a fair contract,
encouraging teamwork through contracts, simplifying contract
words and setting out clear management procedures (Latham
1994: 37). In addition to those proposals, Latham suggests that
the New Engineering Contract contains almost all the elements
of his proposals (Latham 1994: 39).
As regards other existing standard forms of contract, he
comments that they do not help solve adversarial problems in
the construction process (Latham 1994: vii) and the standard
Joint Contract Tribunal (JCT) and Institution of Civil Engineers
(ICE) forms are either heavily amended or are not used by
clients and contractors (Latham 1994: 32). Moreover, Latham
strongly recommends that those standard forms be altered in
order to meet his principles for modern contracts (Latham 1994:
40). By 1998 all of the contract drafting bodies in the UK had
completed revisions to their standard forms to take into account
these suggestions and recent legislative changes. 
As regards Latham’s exhortation for a spirit of mutual trust and
co-operation, embodying such philosophies into construction
contract clauses provides something of a challenge in the light
of contract policy. As already noted, these very principles have
long been thought of as characteristic of Japanese construction
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT POLICY: DO WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY ?
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One important point about Latham’s report is the legislation
required to implement his recommendations fully. In spite of
controversies in the industry, some aspects have been enacted as
The Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996
(HGCR). Although there was little organised opposition, there
were some individuals who had reservations about the prospect
of further legislation (for example, Uff 1997a). According to
McLellan (1995), the greatest opposition to legislation came
from public clients, such as the Ministry of Defence and the
Department of Trade and Industry. This is a very interesting
observation because although Latham (1996) himself insists
that satisfying clients must be the ultimate objective, and the
prime aim of his report is to achieve client satisfaction, his
recommendations seemed not be welcomed by all clients.
However, it is now clear that the public sector is solidly behind
the approaches to construction procurement that were suggested
by Latham (Cabinet Office Efficiency Unit 1995, Bourn 2001).
Within the industry, trade contractors have always been strong
supporters of Latham’s recommendations (Estates Gazette 1995,
Klein 1995), particularly because of the provisions for payment
protection. Indeed, there is growing enthusiasm from all sectors
of the industry for these innovative working practices. 
Some interesting arguments are introduced by Barrie (1995)
about construction contract legislation. One of them is that what
is needed is a culture change in the construction industry (a call
commonly encountered in many contemporary reports about the
industry) rather than legislation, and that the teamwork sought
by Latham cannot be legislated for because it is a matter of
trust, maintaining relationships and mutual understanding.
However, as Latham pointed out in his report, the legislation
was intended as a back-up to improved working practices,
rather than a pre-requisite.
Among those who opposed legislation, Wallace (1997) felt that
it could lead to a new protectionism in the industry. Uff (1997a)
also warned against a rushed timetable for legislation. He
counselled that the Latham Report itself was prepared in a very
short period. He suggested that the legislation needed debate
and consideration before it was implemented. Finally, Cox and
Townsend (1997) insisted that Latham’s report had several
fundamental weaknesses because Latham could not solve “the
root-cause” of the industry’s problems. This weakness might be
a cause of the dissatisfaction shown by some major parties in
the construction process with the legislation arising from
Latham’s recommendations. 
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT POLICY: DO WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY ?
Legislating for Latham’s
recommendations
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According to Eggleston (1996), the NEC is radically different
from traditional standard forms of contract used in the UK. He
reiterates the three main objectives in drafting the NEC:
• It should be more flexible in its scope than existing standard 
f o r m s
• It should provide a greater stimulus to the good management 
of projects than existing forms
• It should be expressed more simply and clearly than existing 
forms (Eggleston 1996)
Armstrong (1991) comments that the NEC was a totally new
type of standard form. He emphasises its flexibility and says
that it can be applied to a range of projects much wider than
those for which existing forms published by the Institution of
Civil Engineers could be used. Rooke and Seymour (1995) state
that the intention of drafting the NEC was to provide “a
framework which will encourage collaboration and planning”.
Moreover, having been endorsed by Latham, the NEC may be
described as a fully “Lathamised” contract (Cox and Thompson
1996). In spite of (or, perhaps, because of) such challenging
departures from the existing forms, the three objectives
mentioned above were not accepted by the industry without
criticism. In an overview of the industry’s responses to the
NEC, Lewis (1996) states that the NEC is more favourable
toward the client than the contractor because the client is more
likely to feel protected by the NEC in settlement. Rooke and
Seymour (1995) comment that the NEC is not welcomed by
lawyers because they tend to view projects in terms of legal
rights and duties, whereas the NEC attempts to emphasise task-
oriented concerns rather than legal ones. Bowdery (1997)
argues that the NEC, which is dependent on the common sense
of participants, would be grossly unfair to contractors in terms
of risk allocation, but this objection is not heard from
contractors generally. Uff (1996) concludes that further
experience would be needed in order to properly assess the
NEC. The main controversy about the NEC could be
summarised as a matter of contract policy, that is, whether
construction contracts should be a manual for project
management practice or an agenda for legal action, a question
that seems to polarise opinions within the industry.
Contracts that do not provide some kind of recourse for
damages for each party are “obligationally incomplete” (Ayres
and Gertner 1992). If this theory applies to construction
contracts, and there is no reason to suppose otherwise, the
NEC’s drafting intentions would produce an “obligationally
incomplete” contract. One of the arguments opposing the use of
contracts as management procedure manuals depends upon the
notion of partnership. Helps (1997) comments on the concept of
“good-faith obligations”, stating that this is at the heart of
Latham’s recommendations. Such obligations are seen in
continental jurisdictions and in English law such a principle is
evident in consumer contracts, as well as in certain particular
relationships. But, as Helps points out, there is not an
underlying obligation in English law to act in good faith in all
circumstances. He gives as an example, the fact that although
the client must not prevent the contractor from carrying out the
work as planned, the client is not contractually obliged to take
positive steps to help the contractor achieve the completion
date. This implies that the courts in the UK have already
developed their own views about “good-faith obligations”. All
of this highlights that the concern that, when discussing contract
policy, the uniqueness of the particular circumstances of the
construction industry should be carefully examined.
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT POLICY: DO WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY ?
The New Engineering Contract
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CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT POLICY: DO WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY ?
The primary objective of this study is to explore the perceptions
of people in the construction industry about construction
contract policy, and to seek their views on Latham’s
recommendations for construction contracts. Therefore, this
survey was constructed in terms of the contractual issues that
derive from the Latham Report. In order to form a basis for the
development of the questionnaire, hypotheses were developed
for each issue. Each hypothesis is outlined below.
PARTNERSHIP, A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL TRUST
AND COOPERATION
Latham, in recommending the use of NEC, suggests that the
employer and the contractor should undertake a project in a
spirit of mutual trust and co-operation. He strongly
recommends that such a spirit should be embodied in the
contract clauses (Latham 1994: 39) - this is a central theme of
the report (Perry 1995). However, it is far from clear that
partnership or a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation can be
contractually assured. Matthews et al (1996) argue that
partnering does not have to be contractual because it is about
working within an open and honest team spirit rather than the
letter of the law. Similarly, Heal (1999) argues that partnering is
not a contract but a process or a management tool. As regards
the efficiency of a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation,
Broome (1995) reports that there is “some evidence” to suggest
that a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation is encouraged and
enhanced by using the NEC. However, Cox and Townsend
(1997) hold the opposite view. They state that partnering is not
suited to all circumstances, and they cite as examples projects
where the costs outweigh the benefits of partnering or where
clients might be exposed to the dangers of single-sourcing (Cox
and Townsend 1997). Cornes (1996) also argues that in the
NEC, the words “in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation”
have been adopted by the draftsman without detailed
consideration of their legal effect. 
As these discussions show, the practicality of ensuring a spirit
of mutual trust and co-operation or partnership seems
debatable. Thus, it is hypothesised that, a spirit of mutual trust
and co-operation cannot be contractually embodied.
Hypotheses underlying the
questionnaire
6
“WIN-WIN” CONTRACTS
According to Jenkins (1995), one aim of the Latham Report was
to reduce conflict in litigation and to encourage productivity
and competitiveness, and this aim is described as “seeking win-
win solutions”. What is “a win-win solution”? Wallace (1997)
comments that the Latham Report makes no attempt to explain
the reasons for the contractual provisions of a win-win solution,
nor to explain precisely what the term means or what may be its
practical or legal consequences. 
Partnering is thought be a concept that encourages a win-win
solution among a project’s participants (Heal 1999). If so, a
win-win solution also might need to be discussed with regards
to its suitability to construction contracts, in a similar manner to
the spirit of mutual trust and co-operation mentioned above. 
In addition, it seems necessary to discuss whether or not the
construction contract needs to be distinguished from other
commercial contracts. Heal (1999) introduces the notion that
construction contracts are not conceptually unique. Similarly, it
is widely stated that the law of construction contracts is, in
principle, the same as that applicable to contracts in general
(May 1995, Murdoch and Hughes 2000). Wallace (1995) states
that construction contracts are distinguished from other major
commercial contracts in that construction products
progressively and irretrievably become the property of the
owner as the work proceeds. However, there seems no evidence
in the light of contract law that construction contracts inherently
demand win-win solutions. Therefore, it is hypothesised that, a
win-win solution is not practicable in construction contracts.
AN AGENDA FOR LITIGATION
Cox and Townsend (1997) point out that if one of the intentions
of the NEC is completely to avoid the courts, then any dispute
or adversarial relationships would imply that the NEC has
failed. Moreover, holding such an aim as a fundamental tenet of
drafting may indicate that the NEC was drafted without
considering the consequences for subsequent litigation.
However, Cooter and Ulten (1988) comment on the definition
of contract laws as follows:
The truth is that contract law’s fundamental purpose is to
enable people to achieve their private ends. In order to
achieve our ends, our actions must have effects. Contract
law gives legal effect to our actions. The enforcement of
p romises helps people to achieve their private ends by
enabling them to rely upon each other and thus to
c o o rdinate their actions.
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This suggests that contracts with no direct provisions for legal
actions can still be complete contracts. As regards construction
contracts, however, Hughes and Greenwood (1996) argue that
contracts should be drafted in a way that reflects the approach
of the courts to contract doctrine and that contracts that disable
litigation are counter-productive. They also state that
attempting to avoid lawyers and litigation can in fact result in a
greater dependence on lawyers and the court because of the
complexities of ascertaining, in the absence of clear written
agreements, who is liable for what, and to whom. They argue
that such attitudes are the product of “nostalgia for a time when
people conducted their deals on a handshake”. Sweet (1991)
points out that the complexity of the construction project
requires many additional contract terms. This suggests a need
for greater involvement of lawyers in construction projects than
before. To test these ideas, it is hypothesised that the threat of
litigation is effective for improving the output of the
construction process.
FLEXIBILITY, CLARITY, PRECISION AND
FAIRNESS
According to Perry (1995), flexibility and clarity are the
principle objectives of drafting the NEC. Moreover, fairness is
a vital theme of the Latham Report. As regards the flexibility of
the NEC, Eggleston (1996) interprets it as an all-purpose
contract for all construction and engineering disciplines at
home and abroad. He also describes the distinct features of the
NEC in terms of flexibility as follows;
• The NEC avoids discipline specific terminology and 
references to the practices of particular industries
• Responsibility for design is not fixed with either the 
employer or the contractor…
• [the NEC gives] a choice of pricing mechanism from lump 
sum to cost plus, and
• allow[s] the employer to build up the provisions in the 
contract to suit his individual policies (Eggleston 1996)
In a similar vein, regarding clarity, Barnes (1991) states that the
NEC is written in ordinary language. Eggleston (1996) adds
that it is written in non-legalistic language using short
sentences and avoiding cross-references. 
Broome defines clarity as follows:
the clauses within a contract fit together to form a logical
whole, are procedurally correct and relevant to modern
c o n s t ruction practice 
(Broome 1995)
Comparing the definitions of flexibility and clarity raises the
question of whether both of them can be achieved
simultaneously. Hughes and Greenwood (1996) argue that it is
difficult to reconcile those two factors, and point out that
flexibility of standard forms of contract can create ambiguity,
encouraging opportunistic behaviour by the parties.
As regards fairness, they point out an incompatibility with
legal precision, stating that a contract clause which is ‘fair’ is
usually vague in terms of precise liability (Hughes and
Greenwood 1996). There is much room for discussion about
flexibility, legal clarity or precision and the concept of fairness.
Therefore, it is hypothesised that, in drafting contracts,
flexibility is not compatible with legal clarity and in drafting
contracts, legal precision is not compatible with fairness.
NON-ADVERSARIAL CONTRACTS
Adversarial relations among the parties to construction projects
seem to be always discussed in relation to the necessity for
partnering. Heal (1999) mentions that partnering moves
beyond a narrow adversarial view of contractual interaction to
an expressly co-operative approach. This brings in to question
whether the adversarial culture of the industry is really a
contractual matter at all, because partnering is generally
thought to be a non-contractual matter. Barnes (1996) argues
that the NEC is intended to be strongly “non-adversarial”. If a
“non-adversarial contract” is one which entails an avoidance of
legal actions or exclusion of the threat of litigation, then there
is a debate about whether it belongs in a discussion of legal
matters. It is the case that a contract should not encourage
adversarial attitudes among the participants (Uff and Capper
1989). However, there is a big contextual difference between
adversarial contracts and adversarial relations. Lewis (1982)
argues that the threat of litigation helps to prevent breaches of
contract and gives businesses the confidence that some of their
expectations will be protected by the court if necessary.
Similarly, Hughes and Greenwood (1996) warn against the
arbitrary avoidance of lawyers and litigation, pointing out the
perils involved with relying on “continuing good relations”.
Therefore, it is hypothesised that, contracts need to be, to some
extent, adversarial and interpretation of contracts should not
rely too much upon continuing good relations throughout the
life of a project.
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CONTRACTS SHOULD BE “LEFT IN THE
DRAWER”
It has been said that in order to run projects successfully,
contracts are best “left in the drawer” during the project (Gray
and Flanagan 1989). Latham is sympathetic to this attitude, in
that he says the contract exists to serve the construction process,
not vice versa (Latham 1994: 36). In order to shed light on this
matter, once again it is useful to consider the purpose of
contract law. Beale and Dugdale (1975) suggest that contract
law might be used by contracting parties to regulate their
relationship and to plan what is to happen in the future; in other
words, to set out the rights of the parties in the event of a
breach of contract. No one would disagree that it would be
better if the need to exercise such rights did not arise in the first
place, but if Beale and Dugdale’s argument is accepted, then the
belief that contracts should be left in the drawer cannot be right
because, without knowledge of the contract, planning for future
events in the contract process could be extremely difficult.
Hughes and Greenwood (1996) suggest that such an attitude is
utter recklessness. Therefore, it is hypothesised that, “contract
documents should not be left in the drawer during the project”.
MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES MANUAL 
There seem to be two views on the purpose of a standard form
of contract in the construction industry. One is that it should
form a manual of project management procedures, and the other
is that it should function as an agenda for litigation. 
The NEC was drafted in accordance with the former view. It
was drafted to stimulate good project management of contracts
by the parties (Broome 1995, Cox and Thompson 1996).
Eggleston (1996) also emphasises communications, co-
operation and programming in the NEC. 
The argument about which approach is the most effective way
of satisfying a client’s requirements should be closely examined
in the light of concepts of contract law and of the construction
industry’s business context. It is hypothesised that, a standard
form of contract is a good way to provide a manual of project
management.
BESPOKE CONTRACTS
Latham argues that clients and contractors heavily amend or do
not use the existing standard forms of contract (Latham 1994:
32) and strongly recommends that clients begin to use the NEC
and to phase out “bespoke” contracts (Latham 1994: 42).
Barnes (1996) claims that NEC is flexible enough to suit every
part of every construction or engineering project. However, not
everyone shares this enthusiasm. First, Gaitskell (1997) argues
that such an approach may reduce the choices open to those
who take part in the construction process and should thus be
criticised from the point of view of “freedom of contract”.
Second, Hughes and Greenwood (1996) state that although
some amendments to standard forms are bad practice, others are
clearly good practice. Third, there is a view that developing a
universal standard form for use in any kind of project is
unrealistic because of the tremendous variations of approach to
the apportionment of risk in different projects (Murdoch and
Hughes 2000). This leads to the eighth hypothesis: Construction
projects may need bespoke contract conditions .
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The survey was divided into two parts: part one was concerned
with the personal data of the respondents and their general
views upon the Latham Report, and part two was concerned
with the views of the respondents on particular issues. In part
one, the respondents were asked to identify their professions,
their business and the standard forms with which they were
familiar. Subsequently this part of the survey also asked about
their recognition of the Latham Report and familiarity with and
attitudes toward the recommendations of the Latham Report.
Part two of the survey consisted of 40 questions related to the
hypotheses.
SAMPLING
The questionnaire forms were mailed to 869 people who mostly
work in the UK construction industry, including public clients,
private clients, consultants, main contractors and trade
contractors. Table 1 provides an indication of the total potential
distribution in the UK, the sample to which the questionnaire
forms were sent, and the number of responses received. A total
of 190 completed questionnaires were received, giving a
response rate of 22%, which is high for surveys of this nature.
ROLE IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECT
Respondents were asked to place themselves in one of five
categories. Some left this blank or ticked “other”, but the name
of the business and job title of the respondent enabled all but
three of the respondents to be categorised, as shown in Table 2.
It is unfortunate that so few trade contractors are willing to take
part in surveys of this nature, as they seem to be among those
most affected by the issues that are under consideration. The
three respondents who did not fall into clear categories were
from educational, research and professional institutions. Since
they could not be categorised, their responses are excluded from
subsequent analyses.
Job title Percentage
Client 22
Consultant 45
Main contractor 21
Trade contractor 10
Other 2
Total 100
Table 2: Job title of the respondent
(Other: Educational, Professional institute, Re s e a r c h )
The research survey was designed to test a number of
hypotheses, among which was the idea that clients, consultants,
main contractors and trade contractors would have distinctly
different views. The next few sections show how the results are
spread between each of these categories.
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Total possible Sample Returned
Public client 60 21 6
Private client 41,580 84 35
Consultant 103,422 215 88
Main contractor 202 72 39
Trade contractor 2,380 84 19
Other Not applicable 40 3
Unknown* Not applicable 353 Not applicable
Total Not applicable 869 190
Table 1: Summary of sampling data
S o u r c e s
•  Public clients and private clients - number of enterprises in 1998, Business Monitor PA1003 : Size analysis of UK
Businesses 1998, Office for National Statistics
•  Consultants - Sum total of figures from Royal Institution of British Architects (RIBA, www.architecture.com) (27,772),
Royal Institution of Chartered Surve yors (RICS, www.rics.org.uk) (75,000) and Association of Consulting Engineers (ACE,
w w w. a c e n e t . c o. u k ) (650) 
•  Main contractors and trade contractors - 4,387 (total) minus 202 (general) and 1,805 (residential) - Hughes et al
1998: 148)
*  Unknown - companies invo l ved with construction activities, but whose precise invo l vement was unclear because they
did not return a questionnaire
FAMILIARITY WITH STANDARD FORMS OF
CONTRACT
Most respondents listed a variety of standard forms, generally
including JCT (Joint Contracts Tribunal, London). A list of all
contracts mentioned is shown in Table 3. Since the incidence of
JCT forms is so significant, Table 4 groups responses in relation
to whether respondents mentioned JCT or not, and those who
were not familiar with any standard forms. Table 4 also shows
how responses differ with the roles of respondents. Those who
responded that they were familiar with “all standard forms of
contract” or “most standard forms of contract” are counted
under the category “including JCT”. Table 4 shows that nearly
three-quarters of clients and nearly all respondents in other roles
are familiar with JCT. The data were tested for differences
between the categories (chi-square test) 1. In order for the
statistical test to be meaningful, the categories of “client” and
“consultant” were combined and, similarly, the categories of
“main contractor” and “trade contractor” were combined. The
chi-square test for two independent samples was then applied
to test the difference between the combined categories. The
result shows no significant difference between client/consultant
and main contractor/trade contractor ( = 0.199). It would be
interesting to study the way that different forms of contract
influenced the perceptions of respondents, but almost none of
the respondents have experience of only one approach to
contracting. Therefore, the impact of a particular approach
would be impossible to disentangle.
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1 . The chi-square test establishes whether there is any association between two categories, i.e. whether they tend to occur together. The significance of the relationship (r) is the probability 
that it could have occurred by chance. Lower values of r indicate higher statistical significance. In order for the chi-square test to be meaningful, there should be no zero or very small 
values in a table (Siegel 1988). The way to overcome this is to combine columns or rows, provided that the resulting combinations are sensible categories in their own right.
Acronym Name of standard form Frequency
BAA Trade Contract British Airport Agency Trade Contract 1
CECA Unknown 1
FCEC Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors 1
JAC/90 Unknown 1
SEAC Electrical Contractors’ Association 1
Not applicable World Bank & EC forms of contract 1
ACE Association of Consulting Engineers 2
BPF British Property Federation 2
ICE MW Institute of Civil Engineers Minor Works Contract 2
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 2
Not applicable Management Contract 2
Not applicable Construction Management Forms 4
ACA Association of Consulting Architects 5
Not applicable No response 5
DOM Domestic Sub-Contract of the Construction Confederation 6
Not applicable None 7
Not applicable Bespoke 10
I.Chem.E. Institution of Chemical Engineers 10
IEE/I.Mech.E MF/1 Institution of Mechanical Engineers/Institute of Electrical Engineers Model Form 11
FIDIC Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs-Conseils 15
GC/Works General Conditions of Contract for Building and Civil Engineering Works 23
JCT/MW Joint Contracts Tribunal Minor Works Form of Contract 29
JCT/IFC Joint Contracts Tribunal Intermediate Form of Building Contract 35
NEC New Engineering Contract/Engineering and Construction Contract 40
ICE Institute of Civil Engineers Conditions of Contract 45
JCT Joint Contracts Tribunal Standard Form of Building Contract 161
Table 3: Standard forms of contract
Role Included JCT Excluded JCT None Total
Client 73% (30) 24% (10) 2% (1) 41
Consultant 93% (81) 6% (5) 1% (1) 87
Main contractor 87% (33) 5% (2) 8% (3) 38
Trade contractor 88% (14) 0% (0) 13% (2) 16
Total 87% (158) 9% (17) 4% (7) 182
Table 4: Categories of standard forms of contract
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AWARENESS OF THE LATHAM REPORT
The respondents were asked about whether they had heard of
the Latham Report. Almost all of them (98%) recognised it. The
chi-square test for two independent samples was carried out to
investigate the difference between combined categories, but
there was no significant difference between categories ( =
0.588). 
FAMILIARITY WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE LATHAM REPORT
The respondents were asked about their familiarity with the
recommendations of the Latham Report. Table 5 shows the
results by category of respondent, excluding those who
previously stated that they were not familiar with the report.
This shows that of those familiar with the report, almost all the
clients (95%), consultants (98%) and main contractors (97%)
are familiar with the recommendations. However, there seems
to be a slightly smaller number of trade contractors (83%) who
are familiar with the recommendations, but the chi-square test
for two independent samples did not reveal any significant
difference between the combined categories ( = 0.147). 
ATTITUDE TOWARD THE
RECOMMENDATIONS
On the question of general attitudes toward the Latham
recommendations, responses are shown in Table 6, which
presents responses only from those who were familiar with the
recommendations. This shows that almost all of those who are
familiar with the recommendations agree with them. Moreover,
half of them wholly agree with the recommendations. By
combining the categories of “agree” and “partially agree”, and
ignoring the category of “don’t know”, the chi-square test for
two independent samples was applied to see if there were
differences between combined role categories, but the result
did not show any significant difference between
client/consultant and main contractor/trade contractor ( =
0.163), which is interesting in view of the differences between
these groups in published opinions, where clients seemed a lot
less enthusiastic than trade contractors.
Group Familiar Not familiar No response Total*
Client 95% (38) 3% (1) 3% (1) 40
Consultant 98% (85) 1% (1) 1% (1) 87
Main contractor 97% (38) 3% (1) 0% (0) 39
Trade contractor 83% (15) 17% (3) 0% (0) 18
Total 96% (176) 3% (6) 1% (2) 184
Table 5: Familiarity with the recommendations of the Latham Report
* Number of people recognising the Latham Report
Group Wholly agree Partially agree Don’t agree Don’t know Total*
Client 53% (20) 47% (18) 0% (0) 0% (0) 38
Consultant 44% (37) 54% (46) 0% (0) 2% (2) 85
Main contractor 58% (22) 37% (14) 3% (1) 3% (1)  38
Trade contractor 67% (10) 27% (4) 7% (1) 0% (0) 15
Total 50% (90) 47% (84) 1% (2) 2% (3) 176
Table 6: Attitude towardsthe Latham Report r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
* Number of respondents f a m i l i a r with the Latham Report’s recommendations
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The second part of the questionnaire consisted of 40 questions
about general contractual issues. Each question relates to one of
the eight hypotheses previously identified, although this was not
revealed to respondents. The respondents were asked to tick one
of six numbers closest to their own view, as follows: “strongly
agree”, “agree”, “neither”, “disagree”, “strongly agree” or
“don’t know”. A blank response was interpreted as “no
response”, rather than “don’t know” and was excluded from the
results. The response for each question is expressed by the
frequency (%), which is obtained by dividing the number of
responses for each category provided by the total number of
effective respondents (190 minus the blanks). Although
responses were sought across six levels of support for each
statement, for the sake of analysis, these categories are
combined into four as follows:
1. Agree = strongly agree + agree
2. Neither agree nor disagree 
3. Disagree = strongly disagree + disagree
4. Don’t know.
This is because, in ranking an ordinal scale like this one, there
is no significance in any distinction between “agree” and
“strongly agree”, or between “disagree” and “strongly disagree”
(Sappsford and Jupp 1996). While one individual may achieve
some degree of consistency in distinguishing strong agreement
from agreement, the way that different people use these
categories is not sufficiently consistent for the analysis to rely
upon them. 
RESPONSES FOR EACH QUESTION 
The responses for each question are summarised in 
Table 7. The questions are related to hypotheses as follows:
• Question 1-6  
Hypothesis 1: Partnership, spirit of mutual trust and 
c o - o p e r a t i o n
• Question 7-11 
Hypothesis 2: “Win-win” contract
• Question 12-15 
Hypothesis 3: An agenda for litigation
• Question 16-21 
Hypothesis 4: Flexibility, clarity, precision and fairness
• Question 22-25 
Hypothesis 5: Non-adversarial contract
• Question 26-31 
Hypothesis 6: “Left in the bottom drawer”
• Question 32-35 
Hypothesis 7: Amanagement procedures manual 
• Question 36-40 
Hypothesis 8: Bespoke contracts
TOTAL SCORE 
In order to express the degree of support for each hypothesis, a
total score can be calculated by summing the numerical
equivalent scores of all the responses within each hypothesis (5
= strongly agree, 4 = agree, 3 = neither, 2 = disagree, 1 =
strongly disagree and 0 = don’t know) (Oppenheim 1992). The
averaged total scores are obtained by dividing the total score for
each hypothesis by the total number of effective responses for
each question. Since the number of questions differs for each
hypothesis, it is useful to express the degree of support for
hypotheses as a percentage, calculated as follows; 
averaged total score - necessary minimum score
maximum possible score - necessary minimum score
where the necessary minimum score is the number of questions
and the maximum possible score is the number of questions
multiplied by five.
The scores for questions 2, 3, 4, 20, 32, 34 and 35 need to be
reversed as follows: 
1 = strongly agree
2 = agree
3 = neither
4 = disagree
5 = strongly disagree
This is because a positive response to these questions means
rejection of the related hypothesis. As mentioned in the
footnotes to Table 7, the responses to question 6 had to be
excluded because of a typing error.
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT POLICY: DO WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY ?
Survey results for general
contractual issues
8
x 100
No Question Response (%)
Agree Neither Disagree Don’t know
1 In drafting contracts, it is difficult to make explicit a spirit of partnership 73 8 18 1
2 Clauses about a spirit of partnership are indispensable 38 32 30 0
3 A clause making a spirit of partnership obligatory would improve project performance 36 30 35 0
4 Co-operation can be enforced by contracts 17 13 70 0
5 Contracts are more efficient when managed with strong authority 57 21 22 1
6* Issues about trusts in contracts cannot be examined in a court 30 22 24 23
7 The prime objective of drafting contracts is to maximise clients’ benefits 16 7 76 1
8 Construction contracts have a lot in common with other kinds of business transaction 35 17 45 2
9 It is not necessary for all the parties in a project to gain profits 13 6 80 0
10 It is not easy for all parties involved to be fairly protected from risks 54 10 36 0
11 Contracts that protect the interests of contractors may reduce the efficiency of their 31 15 52 1
performance
12 The complexity of the modern construction process demands the involvement of lawyers 26 10 64 0
13 The threat of legal action encourages a contractor’s good performance 13 13 74 0
14 The threat of legal action encourages a client’s prompt and full payment 27 15 57 1
15 Contracts should provide mechanisms to protect the financial interests of the parties 91 7 2 0
16 Contracts should be precise in their wording 95 3 2 0
17 Absolute liability to one party may enable the other party to be unfair 75 10 13 2
18 Loose contractual terms encourage opportunistic behaviour 76 13 11 1
19 Contracts should apportion risks fairly between the parties 89 4 6 1
20 Fairness does not necessarily require precision in contractual obligations 45 16 37 2
21 Fair-mindedness compromises efficiency 4 7 87 1
22 Strictness of interpretation of contracts enables swift decisions 43 24 32 1
23 Punitive clauses are essential in order to protect the interests of the parties 21 19 60 1
24 Contracts which rely on trust are ambiguous 45 19 35 1
25 Contractual disputes are an efficient way to resolve conflict 7 7 85 1
26 Each party should understand its precise contractual obligations before commencing 98 1 1 0
work on the project
27 Each party should constantly compare what actually happens with what the 41 24 36 0
contract states
28 Each party needs a detailed understanding of contract law 38 23 38 1
29 Good understanding of contractual matters contributes to client satisfaction 62 19 19 1
30 Good understanding of contractual matters may help the parties to reduce financial 78 12 9 0
losses caused by unpredictable risks
31 Pre-planning for all eventualities of the construction process is vital 78 13 9 0
32 Standard forms of contract should help to explain to clients what they should do if 80 14 6 0
they are dissatisfied with the work of the contractor
33 Contractual obligations should prescribe the behaviour of the parties 62 21 15 2
34 Contracts should make clear the requirements for parties to notify each other of 93 4 2 1
events that might influence the fulfilment of their obligations
35 Contracts terms should be clear about the consequences of non-conformance 96 3 1 0
36 It is not possible to produce a single standard form of contract suited to all types of 72 11 17 1
construction project
37 Standard forms of contract tend to be maliciously amended when one party has more 70 13 14 3
economic power than the other
38 Clients prefer their own bespoke contracts 41 26 28 5
39 Standard forms of contract are likely to be interpreted ambiguously 24 17 57 2
40 Good contracts are project-specific 45 20 34 1
Table 7: Summary of responses
* Due to a ty p o g raphical error, this question cannot be relied upon. “Trusts” has a very different meaning from “trust”. There is no way of ascertaining
how the respondents interpreted this, so the results for this question were not used for subsequent analysis.
N OTE: Because of the way that the questions are phrased, scores for questions 2, 3, 4, 20, 32, 34 and 35 had to be reversed for obtaining the total
scores and for consistency analysis.
RICS Foundation •1 7w w w . r i c s - f o u n d a t i o n . o r g
Questions 12 and 15 were excluded from the calculation of the
total score for hypothesis 3, and questions 16, 19 and 21 were
excluded from the calculation for the total score for hypothesis
4 because those questions were not designed to test the
hypotheses in this strictly mathematical way. The summary of
the averaged total scores for each hypothesis is shown in Table
8.
CONSISTENCY ANALYSIS
Further investigation was carried out to test the consistency of
the responses between the questions within each hypothesis. To
test for consistency, the ‘Sign Test’was applied. The Sign Test
can be applied to two related samples when the analyst wishes
to establish that two conditions are different (Siegel 1988). The
Sign Test was particularly useful if the measurement scale is
only ordinal (Daniel 1978), as it is here. Therefore, the Sign
Test was used here to test the consistency of the responses
between two questions that equivalently examine the attitudes
of respondents toward a particular hypothesis. The null
hypothesis is that there is no difference in the responses
between two questions that ask about the respondents’views on
a particular subject and the alternative hypothesis is that there is
a difference. In order to keep the test simple, the original
scoring of responses was re-arranged as follows: 
5 = strongly agree + agree 
3 = neither
1 = disagree + strongly disagree. 
As before, the scores for questions 2, 3, 4, 20, 32, 34 and 35
were reversed. Responses such as “no response” and “don’t
know” for either question were excluded from testing.
HYPOTHESIS 1: A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL TRUST
AND CO-OPERATION CANNOT BE
CONTRACTUALLY EMBODIED
Generally, although Latham’s Report strongly recommends that
contracts should be based upon partnership, a spirit of mutual
trust and co-operation, these results reveal that respondents
would find difficulty accepting that this can actually be done.
Not only did most respondents feel that it would be difficult to
make explicit a spirit of partnership (question 1) or to
contractually oblige the parties to co-operate (question 4), but
also these results reveal that there is not strong support for
either of these ideas (question 2). Moreover, respondents are
fairly evenly divided on the matter of whether a spirit of
partnership might make a contribution to the efficiency of
project performance (question 3). Interestingly, quite a few
people felt that contracts were more efficient when managed
authoritatively (question 5). This does not sit well with the ideas
of mutual trust and co-operation.  
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Box 1: Statistical results for hypothesis 1
Consistency analysis was undertaken first for the responses
to questions 1 and 4, which test the perception of
respondents about the difficulty of embodying a spirit of
partnership and co-operation in a contract. According to the
Sign test, the distributions of responses show consistency (
= 0.377). Nearly 70% of the respondents support the
h y p o t h e s i s .
The consistency analysis for questions 2, 3 and 5, collects
together questions that were aimed at investigating the
perception of respondents about contract clauses in terms of
a spirit of partnership.  Question 2 and 3 show significantly
similar distributions ( = 0.302). Both results indicate neutral
attitudes toward the effectiveness of a spirit of partnership
for the construction process. However, the results from
Question 5 are inconsistent with the results from Questions 2
and 3. Both values obtained by the Sign test are less than
0 . 0 0 0 1 .
Hypothesis Questions Averaged total score Percentage
1 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 17 58
2 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 13 38
3 13, 14 5 34
4 17, 18, 20 10 62
5 22, 23, 24, 25 10 39
6 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 22 65
7 32, 33, 34, 35 9 33
8 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 16 56
Table 8: Summary of averaged total scores
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The inconsistency between views on partnership and the view
on authoritative approach indicates that respondents are not
fully convinced about relying on a spirit of partnership. The
averaged total score of 17 (58%) for this hypothesis suggests
that it is only mildly supported (Table 8 and Box 1).
HYPOTHESIS 2: A “WIN-WIN” SOLUTION IS
NOT PRACTICAL
According to the results, a “win-win” solution is not perceived
as an impractical aim in construction contracts.  Respondents
feel that the prime objective of contracts is not only to achieve
clients’satisfaction (question 7) but also to ensure profit for all
the parties involved (question 9). At the same time, more than
half of the respondents feel it is difficult to protect all parties
from project risks (question 10). It is interesting, in the light of
contract law, that although the contractual environment of the
construction industry is not much different from that of others
kind of business, most people felt that construction contracts
had little in common with other kinds of contract, such as the
contracts in which they engage outside of the construction
supply chain, whether as buyers or sellers (question 8).
Although nearly half the respondents feel that contractual
protection of the interests of contractors would not harm the
efficiency of their performance, nearly one third of respondents
thought it might (question 11). Generally, the averaged total
score of 13 (38%) reveals a strong rejection of the hypothesis
(from Table 8 and Box 2).
It is interesting to note that although the above results infer that
“win-win” contracts might be acceptable in the industry, some
respondents feel that risks might be unfairly borne by one party,
as the result for question 10 indicates.
HYPOTHESIS 3: THE THREAT OF LITIGATION
CAN IMPROVE THE OUTPUT OF THE
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS
These results reveal various views about the legal context of
contracts. Although modern construction processes are
increasingly complex, most people do not wish to rely on
lawyers in order to deal with the complexities (question 12).
This may infer that respondents feel that the complexity of the
construction process should not automatically lead to
contractual complexities. Moreover, more than half of the
respondents do not feel that the threat of legal action will help
to ensure good performance on the part of the contractor
(question 13). However, the proportion of respondents who
agreed with the effectiveness of the threat of legal action over
the clients’performance (question 14) was slightly more than
over the contractors’one (question 13). It is interesting to note
that almost all the respondents expect contracts to provide
mechanisms to protect the financial interests of the parties
(question 15), even though most disagree that the threat of legal
action is effective. The average of the total score of 5 (34%)
infers that there is mild rejection of this hypothesis by the
respondents.
The comparison between those questions in Box 3 may infer
that the respondents feel more strongly the ineffectiveness of
the threat of legal action toward contractor’s performances than
toward clients’prompt payment.
HYPOTHESIS 4: INCOMPATIBILITY OF
FLEXIBILITY, CLARITY, PRECISION AND
FAIRNESS
These results show that the respondents favour clarity and
flexibility of contracts over fairness. The result of question 16
reveals that almost all the respondents wish for precise
wordings in contracts. Similarly, the results of questions 19 and
21 show that fair-mindedness is largely supported by the
respondents in terms of risk allocation and as a catalyst for
efficient progress of the project.  
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Box 2: Statistical results for hypothesis 2
Consistency analysis was applied to questions 7 and 9, which
were designed to explore perceptions about objectives of
construction contracts. Both sets of responses show
significant consistency ( = 0.232). They indicate that most
respondents felt that contracts should be drafted not only for
clients but also for all other parties to gain profits. On the
other hand, the result of question 10 gives a different pattern
from question 7 ( < 0.0001) and 9 ( < 0.0001). The result
of question 10 suggests that it is difficult to protect all parties
from risks. The aim of questions 8 and 11 was to examine
the acceptability of “win-win” contracts among the
respondents. Both results show significant consistency 
( = 0.248). This may infer that some people feel that the
business environment of the construction industry is
conducive to “win-win” contracts and such contracts would
not harm the efficiency of contractors’performance. 
Box 3: Statistical results for hypothesis 3
Comparing the results for questions 12 and 15, even though
the result of question 12 indicates that the involvement of
lawyers in the construction process is not preferred by the
respondents, some mechanisms to protect the financial
interests of the participants are demanded by almost all the
respondents ( < 0.0001). The results of question 13 and 14
give a significant inconsistency in the responses toward the
hypothesis ( < 0.0001).
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This tendency might contradict the result of question 5, which
reveals that more than half of the respondents feel that strong
authority results in efficient contractual performance. The result
of question 17 may infer that most respondents feel that
precision of contract wording is not compatible with fairness.
Similarly, the result of question 18 may mean that flexibility of
contractual terms would result in opportunistic behaviour by the
other contracting parties. This tendency is reinforced by the
result of question 20 which shows that a slight majority feels
that fairness is incompatible with precision in contractual
obligations.
The results shown in Box 4 can be summarized as follows:
Although legal clarity is thought necessary in contracts,
flexibility is not compatible with it.  
Similarly, fairness seems to be widely accepted but legal
precision is not compatible with it. This is shown in the result
of the total score for this hypothesis of 10 (62%), which
includes the scores for questions 16, 19 and 21 as mentioned
above.
HYPOTHESIS 5: CONTRACTS SHOULD BE
ADVERSARIAL AND NOT RELY ON GOOD
RELATIONS
Although quite a few respondents felt strict interpretation of
contracts helped with efficient decision-making (question 22),
most disagreed that contracts needed to contain punitive
clauses, even if the purpose of those clauses was to protect the
interests of the parties (question 23). However, there are doubts
about the clarity of contracts which rely on trust (question 24).
Most respondents do not see contractual disputes as an efficient
way to resolve conflict (question 25), although they could be
one of the mechanisms to protect their interests in the project.
The average of the total score of 10 (39%) and the results in
Box 5 indicate that the responses do not support the hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 6: CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
SHOULD NOT BE “LEFT IN THE BOTTOM
DRAWER”
There is a clear message from the respondents that contracts
should be carefully understood from the outset of a project
(question 26). Despite this, less people feel that they should
compare what they understood with what actually happens
during the project (question 27). 
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT POLICY: DO WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY ?
Box 4: Statistical results for hypothesis 4
Questions 16, 19 and 21 focused on attitudes toward
precision and fairness. The results of question 19 and 21
give a significant consistency of responses ( = 1.000),
and they may infer that fairness is supported by most
respondents. However, the comparisons between the results
of question 16 and 19, and between those of question 16
and 21 give no significant consistency. The -values
obtained by those comparisons are 0.034 and 0.020
respectively. Questions 17, 18 and 20 are directly
associated with the hypothesis. While the results of
question 17 and 18 gave a very similar distribution of the
responses ( = 0.732), which would strongly support the
hypothesis, the result of question 20 is inconsistent with
them. Both -values for the comparisons between question
17 and 20 and between 18 and 20 are less than 0.0001. 
Box 6: Statistical results for hypothesis 6
The results of questions 27 and 28 show a significantly
similar distribution of the responses ( = 0.689). Both
distributions of responses may indicate the neutral views of
the respondents with regard to this hypothesis.
Interestingly, the distributions of responses to questions 30
and 31 are also almost the same. The Sign test shows that
there is significant consistency between the results 
( = 0.900) and both indicate that 78% of the respondents
support the hypothesis. Compared to the results for
questions 30 and 31, the result of question 26 shows a very
different and much stronger view. The -values obtained
for both comparisons are less than 0.0001. On the other
hand, the Sign test indicates that the idea behind question
29 is less strongly supported than those behind questions 30
and 31. The inconsistencies in the responses to questions 27
and 28 on the one hand, and those to questions 30 and 31
on the other, are demonstrated by the Sign test. Both 
-values between questions 27 and 30 and between 27 and
31 are less than 0.0001. Similarly, both -values between
question 28 and 30 and between 28 and 31 are also less
than 0.0001.
Box 5: Statistical results for hypothesis 5
The responses to questions 22 and 24 give a significant
consistency ( = 0.846). Both results show similar trends in
that perceptions are slightly in favour of strictly interpreting
contracts. However, in the responses to the bald statement
in question 23, a different attitude emerges. Both -values
(question 22 vs question 23 and question 24 vs question 23)
are less than 0.0001. Although about 45% of the
respondents expect contracts to be strictly interpreted
without relying on trust between the parties (question 24),
60% of them prefer not to have punitive clauses in
contracts (question 23). The results of questions 23 and 25
both show that most people are averse to adversarial
clauses in contracts. Indeed, the Sign test indicates that
people seem to be particularly averse to contractual
disputes ( < 0.0001).
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Overall, it may be concluded that the attitude of “the contract
should be left in the bottom drawer” is not supported by the
respondents.  The average of the total score of 22 (65%) also
indicates that the hypothesis is supported by the respondents.
The inconsistencies revealed by the analysis in Box 6 are
striking.
HYPOTHESIS 7: A STANDARD FORM OF
CONTRACT IS A GOOD MEANS FOR
PROVIDING GUIDANCE FOR PROJECT
MANAGEMENT
There is a strong evidence that most respondents expect
contracts to provide guidance for litigation (question 32), rather
than for management procedures, although the prescription of
the behaviour of the parties is not as popular as other aspects of
contractual obligations and duties (question 33). These results
seem to contradict the results for hypothesis 5. This suggests
that although people do not want adversarial contracts as long
as there is no need for them (hypothesis 5), they actually want
punitive clauses to protect themselves when their interests are
threatened (questions 32 and 35).
Question 27 (hypothesis 6) has results which appear to
contradict other views of the respondents. If, as these results
reveal, people do not feel it is necessary to compare what
actually happens with specific contract clauses, it brings into
question the practice of including in contracts clauses that
might help one party to deal with the failure or poor
performance of other party. However, on the whole, the
hypothesis is not supported by the respondents as indicated by
the average total score of 9 (33%). 
The lack of consistency in responses regarding this hypothesis
(see Box 7) seems to arise from the extent to which contracts
can be called upon to deal with the way that people behave.  
While there is clear support for the idea of clear contractual
obligations, there is not such strong support for the idea of
prescribing behaviour. Therefore, it is clear that the respondents
tend to favour the view of contracts as a legal, rather than a
management instrument.
HYPOTHESIS 8: CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
NEED BESPOKE CONTRACTS
These results are interesting in the light of the general
preference in the construction industry for standard forms of
contract. Most respondents agreed that there is no single
standard form of contract which can cope with all types of
construction. Clearly, any reduction in the choice between
standard construction contracts will not be welcomed.
Bespoke, or project-specific contracts were not strongly
supported by the respondents (questions 38 and 40). This may
infer that people still feel some advantages or effectiveness of
using standard forms of contract. However, there is no evidence
in this survey that people wish to phase out bespoke contracts.
The average of the total score of 16 (56%) also indicates that
the hypothesis is mildly supported by the respondents. The
inconsistency highlighted in Box 8 can only be interpreted by
saying that although most respondents see disadvantages in
standard forms of contract, bespoke contracts are not seen as a
viable alternative.
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT POLICY: DO WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY ?
Box 7: Statistical results for hypothesis 7
The results of questions 34 and 35 both indicate a clear
rejection of the hypothesis. The Sign test shows significant
consistency between the results ( = 0.317). Although the
result of question 32 also seems to confirm this, the Sign
test did not reveal any significant consistency between the
results of questions 32 and 34 ( = 0.0001) or questions 32
and 35 ( < 0.0001). The results for question 33 indicate an
opposite view, by comparison with results from other
questions. The Sign test also reveals inconsistency between
the results for question 33 and those for questions 34 and
35 respectively. Both -values obtained by the comparisons
are less than 0.0001.
Box 8: Statistical results for hypothesis 8
The results of questions 36 and 37 show similar
distributions of responses which may give strong support
for the hypothesis ( = 0.912). On the other hand, the
results of questions 38 and 40 also show similar
distributions of responses ( = 0.366), which do not
strongly support the hypothesis. Moreover, the results of
question 39 reveal an opposite view to the results of
question 36 ( < 0.0001) and 37 ( < 0.0001). This may
infer that the hypothesis is not be supported by the
respondents.
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The responses obtained were split according to the role of
respondents - “clients”, “consultants”, “main contractors” and
“trade contractors”. This is because construction contract
problems need to be approached with an awareness of the
diversity of the professions, specialists and suppliers involved
(as identified by Murdoch and Hughes 1996: 2). The responses
were also split according to respondents’familiarity with
standard forms of contract: “JCT” and “Not JCT”, to examine
whether there were systematic differences of opinion
attributable to different sectors of the industry. Different “world
views” in the construction industry are likely to be affected by
issues such as “professional culture”, “legal culture” or “claims
culture” (Rooke and Seymour 1995). Moreover, as one
institution that was singled out for criticism by Latham (1994:
41), it seems important to examine the survey results with
specific reference to JCT contracts.
In order to statistically examine the trends in responses, the
Kolmogorov-Smirov two-sample test (‘the KS Test’) was
applied to each question. The KS Test is considered one of the
most powerful tests of whether two independent samples have
been drawn from the same population (Siegel 1988). In
addition, it is sensitive to differences of all types that may exist
between two independent samples (Daniel 1978). In this
analysis, the one-tailed KS Test is applied in order to decide
whether the data value of one sample group is larger (or
smaller) than that of another group. 
In addition to the results obtained by the KS Test, two statistical
numbers such as mean and median are calculated so as to
represent the distribution of the response for each categorised
group. Although the data analysis for each question discussed in
the previous section is based upon the four categories of the
response such as “agree”, “neither”, “disagree” and “don’t
know”, the statistical analysis of differences between groups
was carried out using five categories: 1, 2, 3, 4,and 5, which
numerically express the attitudes of the respondents. The
summary of the KS Test and values of mean and median for
each comparison mentioned above are shown in Maeda (1999).
While there are some statistically significant differences
between the groups, none is of sufficient magnitude to warrant
detailed commentary at the level of individual questions here.
COMPARISON OF THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT
FOR HYPOTHESES WITHIN THE ROLES OF
THE RESPONDENTS
In order to examine the attitudes of each role group toward the
hypotheses outlined in section 6, the data were examined
according to the roles of the respondents. The results are
summarised in Table 9. The scores of each role group indicated
in the table are averaged figures within each group.
Further, in order to examine attitudinal differences between role
groups, the t-test was applied for each hypothesis. The aim of
the one-tailed t-test is not only to test the difference between the
mean averages of two populations, but also the direction of this
difference. Use of the t-test assumes that the standard deviations
of the two populations are equal. This assumption can be tested
using the f-test (Rees 1995). When the f-test rejects the equality
of the standard deviations of two populations (the p-value is
less than 0.05), Welch’s modified t-test should be applied in
order to test the difference in the means of such two
populations. All the results of the f-test and t-test between the
roles for each hypothesis are shown in Maeda (1999) with only
the salient findings reported here.
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Comparison of perceptions
according to the roles of
respondents and their familiarity
with standard forms of contract
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Clients Consultants Main contractors Trade contractors All respondents
Hypothesis 1 16.3 (56%) 16.8 (59%) 16.8 (59%) 16.4 (57%) 16.6 (58%)
Hypothesis 2 13.0 (37%) 12.9 (36%) 12.2 (33%) 11.9 (31%) 12.7 (38%)
Hypothesis 3 5.0 (38%) 4.9(36%) 4.3 (28%) 4.3 (28%) 4.7 (34%)
Hypothesis 4 10.3 (61%) 10.4 (62%) 10.5 (62%) 10.7 (64%) 10.4 (62%)
Hypothesis 5 10.4 (40%) 10.6 (41%) 9.7 (35%) 9.4(34%) 10.3 (39%)
Hypothesis 6 21.1 (63%) 21.5 (65%) 22.6 (69%) 21.9 (66%) 21.7 (65%)
Hypothesis 7 8.8(30%) 9.4 (34%) 9.1 (32%) 9.2 (33%) 9.2 (33%)
Hypothesis 8 16.3 (56%) 15.7 (54%) 16.5 (58%) 16.4 (57%) 16.1 (56%)
Table 9: Average of total scores for the hypotheses
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In hypothesis 3, the t-test shows significant differences between
clients and main contractors (p = 0.012), between clients and
trade contractors (p = 0.027) and between consultants and main
contractors (p = 0.034). Therefore, it can be said that main
contractors (28%) and trade contractors (28%) disagree with
this hypothesis more strongly than clients (38%) or consultants
(36%). 
In hypothesis 5, the t-test shows significant differences between
consultants and main contractors (p = 0.034), and between
consultants and trade contractors (p = 0.028). Since the score of
consultants (41%) is slightly higher than main contractors
(35%) and trade contractors (34%), it follows that the attitude
of clients is closer to neutral than those of main contractors and
trade contractors.
In hypothesis 6, the t-test shows significant differences between
clients and main contractors ( = 0.012), and between
consultants and main contractors ( = 0.039). Since the score
for main contractors (69%) is slightly higher than that for
clients (63%) and consultants (65%), it follows that main
contractors have more favourable views towards this hypothesis
than do clients and consultants.
In hypothesis 7, the t-test shows significant differences between
clients and consultants (p = 0.012). This may mean that clients
(30%) are more averse to this hypothesis than consultants
(34%). 
No significant difference is shown by the t-test for any of the
other hypotheses.
The results about the use or development of a single standard-
form contract do not support Latham’s recommendations, which
counsel clients to use more standardised forms of contract.
Interestingly, Banwell’s (1964) similar findings in favour of the
development of a single standard form contract for use in the
building and civil engineering industries has resonance with
Latham’s suggestion, but seems to have been followed by a
proliferation of different standard forms, rather than a focus
upon one.
The survey generated 190 responses, of which 187 could be
used in the analysis. A very wide range of standard forms of
contract is currently in use. Most respondents recognised the
Latham Report. Of those who have heard of it, most are aware
of Latham’s recommendations. Of those who are familiar with
the recommendations, nearly all respondents say that they agree
with them when asked for an overall reaction. However,
respondents are equivocal about the notion of basing contracts
on a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation. Not only was there
a neutral response to the idea that a spirit of partnership would
improve project performance, but there was also a clear
sentiment that authoritative contract management would
improve performance, contrary to the underlying message
embodied in current moves towards innovative working
practices.
The development of “win-win” contracts is perceived as a
desirable, but impractical aim. Nearly one third of respondents
felt that performance would be compromised if contractors were
better protected by contracts. Most respondents do not wish to
rely upon lawyers - indeed, most feel that the threat of legal
action will not improve the performance of those with whom
they contract.  However, almost all respondents expect contracts
to provide the means to protect their financial interests.
While there is very strong support for precision and fairness in
contracts, there is not agreement that the two can go together.
Most people feel that loose terms encourage opportunism and
that contracts should apportion risks fairly between the parties.
Respondents were generally not in favour of strict interpretation
of contracts, nor of punitive clauses. However, there is a greater
acceptance of strict, though not punitive, interpretation.
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Conclusions
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Although ambiguity may accompany contracts that rely on
trust, most people feel that contractual disputes are not an
efficient means of dispute resolution.
The results also suggest that those within the construction
industry feel that contracts should not be “left in the bottom
drawer”. There was almost unanimous support for the idea that
each party should understand its contractual obligations before
commencing work on a project. However, there was less
support for comparing what happens to what the contract says
or for parties to have a better understanding of contract law.
There is general support for “hard” rather than “soft” contracts
in that the respondents feel that contracts should:
• provide recourse for dissatisfied clients
• prescribe parties’ b e h a v i o u r
• require parties to keep each other informed 
• be clear about the consequences of non-conformance
The survey respondents felt that, on the whole, standard-form
contracts should not seek to be appropriate for all types of
project and that unequal bargaining power between the parties
may lead the more powerful to introduce malicious
amendments to standard forms. While respondents saw that
standard forms have disadvantages, they did not seem to
consider bespoke contracts to be any better.
This survey indicates that the significant changes that have been
made to contract drafting policy in the UK seem not to have
recognised the complex tensions that are inherent in the
business of contracting. On the face of it, most people seem to
agree with the sentiments embodied in innovative working
practices. What is worrying is that, when these issues are
disentangled, many of these same people actually disagree at a
fundamental level with the principles upon which such practices
are based. Therefore, current efforts to change attitudes and the
culture of the industry need to be aimed not just at getting
agreement on broad policy statements, but at dealing with
perceptions at a much more detailed level.
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